CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTANI MARKET by Ullah, Sabeeh & Kamal, Yasir
PAKISTAN BUSINESS REVIEW JAN 2018
Research
978
Corporate Cash Holdings  . . .Research




The purpose of this study is to understand the influence of
cash holdings on shareholder wealth in Pakistan. After probing  panel
data ranging from 2006 to 2014, the study provides evidence that the
size of the firm (RSIZE) shows noteworthy positive correlation with
cash holding, whereas Leverage and Close Cash Substitute (CCS)
are negatively related to cash holding. The negative correlation of
leverage with cash holding provides support to the “pecking-order
theory” in that companies use cash funds to pay back obligations
when they turn out to be outstanding. These results also contribute
some backing to the trade off theory, especially to (Keynes, 1936)
“precautionary motive” where companies stockpile more cash. This
study also funds that excess cash holding has a positive relation with
market capitalization, which means that excess cash holdings
increase shareholder wealth. These results are contrary to the earlier
studies and reflect that excess cash holding has an effect on
shareholder wealth in Pakistan.
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Introduction
The credit crisis of late 2007 that started in the United States
of America had spread to the global market and affected the credit
market dependent firms. Most of the companies were forced by the
momentous credit crunch, resulting in a costly and restrictive credit
market, to hold sufficient cash. Due to this turmoil, cash holdings got
significant importance from organizations, investors, specialists and
researchers.
Keynesian economic theory (1936) explained that firms hold
cash due to precautionary, transaction, and speculative motives. Bigelli
and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) found that those companies that hold an
excess amount of cash are more profitable and, subsequently, are in a
better position to pay more dividends and invest more in future
prospects. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, (1999) found that, in
order to maximize shareholder wealth, optimal level of cash holding
must be set at such a level that it offsets the marginal cost and benefits
of cash holding.
The tradeoff theory of cash holding, from the perspective of
shareholder wealth maximization, states that if an organization wants
to maximize shareholder wealth then they should reach an “optimal
level” of stockpile of cash that equates the marginal profits and charges
(Ferreira & Vilela, 2004). But this theory is in conflict with the “pecking
order theory” (Myers & Majluf, 1984), stockpiles of cash are an
inappropriate “sideshow” and that no stockpiles of cash exist (Opler
et al., 1999). Companies face positive or negative cash flows as the
level of cash holdings change (Bao, Chan, & Zhang, 2012). Dittmar,
Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003); Jensen (1986) argued that from
Agency theory the level of cash holding is limited.  For the cost and
benefits of cash holding, in general, conflicts arise between the
management and shareholders. Lee and Powell (2011) documented
that at the expense of shareholders, companies hold persistent cash.
The freedom of choice for the manager rises with excess cash holding
which lessens the firm’s risk (Opler et al., 1999). Lee and Powell (2011)
argued that if management holds excess cash then it leads to decrease
in the value of all activities and lesser company value (Kalcheva &
Lins, 2007). Kuan, Li, and Chu (2011) suggested that the cash holdings
of family and non-family owned companies are affected by corporate
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governance. Firms that hold more cash in diversification have lower
shareholder rate (Tong, 2011), deprived “corporate governance”
(Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007), highest level of “information
asymmetry” (Drobetz, Grüninger, & Hirschvogl, 2010) but firms hold
more cash in those countries where shareholders are not protected
(Al-Najjar, 2013). Despites these rich countries, Pakistani firms hold
more cash than firms in many other developed countries (Dittmar et
al., 2003). Also as reported by Shah (2011), Fuji Fertilizer Company
(FFC) and Oil and Gas Development Company (OGDC) of Pakistan
hold Rs. 3.1 billion and Rs. 19 billion of cash respectively on their
balance sheet in the year 2003, which were increased to Rs. 4.1 billion
and Rs. 25 billion and respectively in the year 2004.
Deduced from the theories and arguments mentioned above,
cash is the result of financing and investment actions. As a result,
cost-effective firms are more proficient towards paying bonuses,
discharge their obligation and accumulate cash. When a company
holds a significant level of cash then it is an indicator of a negligible
payment of dividend. Such companies make decisions of reinvestment
rather than paying dividend. As Shareholders are not protected in a
country like Pakistan (Ghani & Ashraf, 2005; Saeed, Belghitar, & Clark,
2014) but they may be fascinated by a greater level of cash holding of
a company because it offers liquidity indication. It is a question worth
pondering upon whether cash holding affects shareholder wealth or
not. In order to find a suitable answer to the aforementioned question
it is appropriate to investigate the issue in the context of Pakistan
with a focus on non-financial companies.
The study is organized as follows. Section II, introduces
review of literature. Section III describes the data collection, variables
and methodology. Section IV consists of the results and discussions.
Section V concludes the study.
Review of Literature
Theoretical and empirical literature is produced in this section
for the purpose of explaining the basic points for excess cash holding.
In the context of “perfect” capital market, the value of a
company is unaffected by the mode of financing because such a
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market is free from taxes, transaction costs and asymmetric information.
Also such a world is devoid of opportunity cost, liquid assets, and
liquidity premium. In reality, however, the markets are not perfect and,
therefore, the cost of transaction is not unrelated. Amihud and
Mendelson (1986) recommend that as cash is the most liquid of all the
assets so there exists some “liquidity premium” between dissimilar
forms of assets because the company suffers the utmost premium or
charge from holding cash funds. Therefore, companies balance the
marginal profits with the marginal costs of holding cash.
Trade off Theory
Companies essentially look for the ideal figure of cash holding
by balancing the marginal charge of maintaining cash with respect to
the marginal profits of keeping cash (Kim, Mauer, & Sherman, 1998;
Miller & Orr, 1966). It is postulated from the Tradeoff theory of cash
holding that if organizations want to maximize shareholder wealth then
they should aim for an ideal level of cash holding that balances the
marginal profits and charges of stockpile of cash (Ferreira & Vilela,
2004). Further precisely, the advantages of maintaining cash arise due
to two important reasons as clarified by Opler et al., (1999).
Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) found that small companies
are prone towards holding excess cash compared to large firms due to
the associated risk and constraints that are financial in nature. In
addition to this their study supported the Tradeoff Model which
postulates that small companies retain excess cash holdings due to
variation in cash flows and lesser taxation. Having said that, the rest
of the variable also supports the essence of Tradeoff Theory. A strong
negative relationship between company’s cash ratio and asset
tangibility was reported by (Drobetz & Grüninger, 2007; Uyar & Kuzey,
2014). Furthermore, a positive relation of companies’ cash flow and
growth opportunities pertinent to cash holdings was reported by
(Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Shabbir, Hashmi, & Chaudhary, 2016; Uyar &
Kuzey, 2014). Excess cash holding was done by companies of small
size, having high research and development ratio, lower networking
capital ratio, and low leverage (D’Mello, Krishnaswami, & Larkin, 2008).
Kim, Kim, and Woods (2011), argued that cash holdings have
a noteworthy positive relation with investment opportunities and
showed an adverse relation with liquid asset alternatives, company’s
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size, dividend payments and capital spending (Akben-Selcuk & Altiok-
Yilmaz, 2017). Excess cash holding showed a significant correlation
for  those companies that were under immense managerial
entrenchment due to financial constraints (Sheu & Lee, 2012).
However, under these two dimensions, excess cash is not correlated
with research and development.
Pecking Order Theory
It is postulated by the Pecking Order Theory, in the presence
of asymmetric information, that due to high information asymmetry
between the company and the lender, it would be less costly for a firm
to benefit from excess cash rather than from external financing (Myers
& Majluf, 1984). To reduce the expenses allied to financing, companies
favor inner funds to finance investment; after that, they go for debt
financing and, lastly, if needed, for equity financing (Ferreira & Vilela,
2004). According to the pecking order theory, we have no ideal base
of cash keeping or debt for the company. It indicates that in case of a
shortage in financing, companies increase both debt and leverage. It
is reported by Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal (2012) that in the occurrence
of lengthier conversion cycle, companies retain higher cash in case
of surplus or deficit financing. Due to independence of dividend
policy in private firms, firms hold more cash for paying dividend.
Testified proof also suggests that bank obligation and net working
capital symbolize worthy alternates of cash. Drobetz and Grüninger
(2007) argued that there is no linear connection between ‘liquidity’
and ’average cash ratio’, whereas dividend outflows and working
cash movements are positively linked to huge cash holdings.
Agency Theory
The problem of agency cost rises with the cash holding
policy of the firm due to which it becomes difficult to find out the
optimal cash holding (Kuan, Li, & Liu, 2012). If the managers,  left to
their own will, waste the resources of the firm and create agency
problems for the firm because the ownership and the control are
separated from the management,  the potential value of the firm will
be discounted due to the negligence of the managers. In order to
avoid such problems good governance is required because cash
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reserves are easily accessible by management and these cash reserves
represent the corporate wealth (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007).
Dittmar et al. (2003) proposed those companies as indication
of agency problem who stockpile cash and argued that the changes in
cash holding are associated with legal structures across countries.
Al-Najjar (2013) documented that companies in countries with poor
shareholder protection rights hold excess cash. While, on the other
hand, in countries with strong shareholder protection rights companies
do not hold too much cash. Companies’ in common legal structures
hold less cash than civil legal structures which support the agency
theory. Harford (1999) suggested that the firms with extra cash are
more probable to assume the value reducing acquisitions.
Jensen (1986); Stulz (1990) developed the free cash flow
hypothesis which suggests one more foundation for managers to
assign the cash inefficiency. It states that the cash flows in the firm are
affected by the manager and corporate governance .The  manager
works for his own interest and ignores the interest of shareholders ,
which causes the firm to grow more than its optimal size and the
manager revels in more monetary benefits , compensations and non-
monetary benefits in the firm.
Recently empirical studies indicate that the results of work
on cash policies and corporate governance have put forward their
views that agency problems between manager and principal arise over
cash exploitation which is more severe in firms where the control of
corporate governance is frail and not in the right hands.
Research Methodology
The major objective of this study was to measure the effect
of corporate cash holding on shareholders’ wealth in Pakistan. For
this purpose, commercial banks, equity investment, Insurance and
financial services were excluded due to the following reasons. Firstly,
due to strong regulation in financial firms (Cheng, Evans III, &
Nagarajan, 2008). Secondly, unique capital structure (Lim, Matolcsy,
& Chow, 2007) of financial firms. Lastly, to make comparisons of the
results with prior studies (Kuan et al., 2012; Saeed et al., 2014), who
also excluded these firms. The remaining 440 companies were considered
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as the target population of the study. Furthermore, from this target
population, 180 stratified sample firms whose data was available and
continuously listed during the study period (i.e.2006-2014) were
selected using proportional allocation method (Cochran, 1977).
Additionally, the study used secondary data source of the non-
financial firms Balance Sheet Analysis (BSA), which is published by
the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP).
Variables of the Study
Based on the above mentioned discussion, this study
followed (Al-Najjar, 2013; Lee & Powell, 2011; Opler et al., 1999)
approach to measure cash holdings. We used cash and short term
deposits divided by total assets less cash and short term deposits as
the dependent variable (cash holding), while the independent variables
include: Firm size, Leverage, Dividend Payment, profitability, and Close
Cash Substitute. Following are the theoretical linkages and
measurement techniques of all the independent variables.
Firm Size
It was reported by (Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2012) that small
companies retain excess cash in comparison with bigger companies
owing to greater financial constraints and risk. Besides that, the study
also backs the essence of the Tradeoff theory which postulates that
excess cash holdings are held by small sized companies, having
variation in their cash flows and also lesser taxation. On the other
hand large firms are less exposed to bankruptcy costs because of
greater diversification, that’s why they hold less cash (Al-Najjar &
Belghitar, 2011). We calculated firm size as natural log of total assets
(Opler et al., 1999).
Leverage
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) suggested that due to better
monitoring high levered firms are less able to hold cash. As a negative
relation exist among leverage and cash holding (Al-Najjar & Belghitar,
2011; Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). We measured leverage
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by current liabilities plus non-current liabilities divided by total assets
(Lee & Powell, 2011).
Close Cash Substitute
D’Mello et al. (2008) reported that a company whose net
working capital ratio is lower holds huge amount of cash. Ferreira and
Vilela (2004) argue that close cash substitute can be easily and quickly
converted into cash at the time of shortage of cash. It is evident from
the empirical literature that cash holding level and close cash substitute
has a negative relation. For close cash substitutes we used net working
capital ratio measured as net working capital divided by Total assets,
where net working capital is calculated as the difference between
current assets and current liabilities net of cash to capture the close
cash substitutes.
Profitability
Companies that hold excess cash are more profitable, as a
result of which they invest more in future and pay extra dividend
(Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal, 2012). In contrast companies that hold less
cash are less profitable and issue debt for financing their projects. It is
evident that cash holding and profitability have a positive relation in
the literature. We measured profitability through ROE which were
calculated as the ratio of net income to Owner’s equity.
Dividend Payment
Kim et al. (2011), argued that cash holding has an adverse
relation with dividend expenses. Opler et al. (1999); Ozkan and Ozkan
(2004) also support this negative relation between cash holding and
dividend payment. Holding of more cash by a company is an indicator
of paying lesser dividend and also signifies that the company is making
a reinvestment decision. For dividend payment we calculated DPO
ratio as dividend per share to earnings per share.
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Hypothesis of the Study
In order to test the effect of cash holding on shareholders’
wealth, the following hypotheses are presented:
H1: The determinants of cash holding have significant relationship
with cash holding in Pakistan.
H2: Cash holding has noteworthy effect on shareholder wealth in
Pakistan.
Analytical model
The techniques for this study were built on the mix of
different statistical methods. Following Al-Najjar (2013); Lee and
Powell (2011); Opler et al. (1999), we used substitute approximation
procedures to check our hypothesis. The model of the study was:
 ..(1)…543210 ititititititit CCSDPOROELeverageRSIZECASH  
Three models were estimated, consisting of (i) a pooled
regression; (ii) a Fixed-Effects model; or Random-Effect model. In order
to choose between the fixed and random effect models (iii) a Hausman
(1978) test was used.
Excess Cash
Secondly, to define excess cash holdings of a company on the basis
of optimal level of cash we used the above mentioned models. The
model is:
iititit .ECASHACASHXCASH 51 ……… (2) 
Shareholder Wealth
Lastly in order to measure our main objective that is whether
excess cash holding affects shareholders wealth in Pakistani market,












For the company i at time t itXCASH  is the excess cash, itACASH
is the actual cash, itECASH  is the expected cash calculated from
equation (1) and i  is the deviation from the mean of the company i,
which were estimated through GARCH (1, 1) series
PAKISTAN BUSINESS REVIEW JAN 2018987
Research Corporate Cash Holdings  . . .
Results and Discussion
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the dependent and
independent variables comprising of number of observations, mean,
standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, Maximum and Minimum. The
cash holding reports positive skewness with a mean of 4.3 percent.
Opler et al. (1999) report a mean of 8.1 percent for cash holding, whereas
(Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007) recommend a mean 22%. More recently
a study conducted by (Lee & Powell, 2011) reported cash holding
mean of 22 percent with high degree of skewness. Table 2 also reports
the skewness and kurtosis for all the variables. The value of skewness
for cash holding is 11.465, which indicates that the distribution is
positively skewed. Also the value of kurtosis for cash holding is
243.989 (>3), means that the distribution is leptokurtic
Table 2:
Summary Statistics for the dependent and independent variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max 
Cash 1620 0.043 0.101 11.465 243.989 0.000 2.561 
RSize 1620 14.851 2.741 -3.601 20.545 0.000 20.023 
Leverage 1620 0.628 0.540 10.712 190.980 0.000 12.163 
CCS 1620 -0.034 0.426 -7.466 108.912 -8.110 0.986 
DPO 1620 0.191 1.038 -3.071 225.770 -20.591 19.400 
ROE 1620 31.409 126.460 17.747 433.581 -887.610 3264.570 
 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficient of each
variable. Firm size (RSize), ROE, and DPO are positively correlated
with cash holding. Whereas, Leverage is negatively correlated with
cash holding, this is consistent with the findings of (J. Kim et al.,
2011). Furthermore, all the independent variables are either positively
or negatively correlated with each other at 10% level.
Table 3:
Pearson Correlation Matrix of the variables
  Cash RSize Leverage CCS DPO ROE 
Cash 1      
RSize 0.1079** 1     
Leverage -0.0979* 0.0593* 1    
CCS -0.0261 0.0610* -0.0862* 1   
DPO 0.0594* 0.0494* -0.0524* 0.0561* 1  
ROE 0.0137 0.0496* 0.0600* -0.0529* 0.008 1 
Note: **and * represent significance at 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively. 
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Table 4 shows the results of Levin Lin Chu unit root test for
panel data. A total of 180 panels over a period of nine years were
analyzed. All the variables Adjusted t-statistics are significant at 1%
level, which means that our null hypothesis (i.e Panels contain unit
root) are rejected. This means that our data is free from the unit root
problem. Hence our data is stationary at 1 percent level of significance.
Table 4:
Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) Unit-root Test for Panel Data
Ho: Panels contain unit roots    Number of panels  =    180 
Ha: Panels are stationary   Number of periods =      9 
Variables Unadjusted t-statistics  Adjusted t-statistics  p-value 
Cash -230.000  -250.000  0.000 
Rsize -150.000  -160.000  0.000 
Leverage -33.957  -29.164  0.000 
CCS -36.623  -32.294  0.000 
DPO -48.551  -30.309  0.000 
ROE -25.886   -15.384   0.000 
 
Table 5 Shows the outcomes of the two models that is pooled
OLS and Fixed effect model. The values of R-Square ranging from
0.087 to 0.126, which means that 8.7% to 12.6% variations in dependent
variable cash holding is explained by independent variables. These
models are best fitted as the values of F-statistics are significant at
1% level, which shows that the models are well stated because 50% or
more variables show significant relationship with cash holding. We
document a significant relationship between size of the firm (RSIZE)
and cash holding. This result contradicts information asymmetry
hypothesis, the hypothesis of financial distress, and the transaction
costs hypothesis. But despite these our result is in conformity with
the results of (Al-Najjar, 2013; Opler et al., 1999) that big firms are in a
better situation to build up cash as they are probably more profitable.
Leverage is negatively related to cash holding in both the models,
whereas close cash substitutes (CCS) is only negatively correlated to
cash holding in fixed effect model. These results are in line with (Lee
& Powell, 2011; Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). These results
are also in conformity with the trade-off theory, especially to (Keynes,
1936) “precautionary motive”. D’Mello et al. (2008) reported that firms
grip huge cash holding when they have a small CCS ratio. The negative
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Table 5:
Regressions results of the determinants of Corporate Cash
holdings
Variable 













Value   
Constant 0.009 0.017 0.540 0.586   0.034 0.017 1.970 0.049   
RSize 0.006 0.001 4.500 0.000   0.005 0.001 4.260 0.000   
Leverage -0.101 0.058 -1.760 0.079   -0.118 0.010 -11.570 0.000   
CCS -0.120 0.081 -1.470 0.141   -0.158 0.011 -14.270 0.000   
DPO 0.005 0.003 1.600 0.109   0.001 0.002 0.360 0.722   
ROE 0.000 0.000 0.520 0.605   0.000 0.000 0.910 0.363   
Observations 1620      1620      
R-Square 0.087      0.126      
F- Statistics 14.64***         41.21***         
***. Significant at 0.01 
level          
 Excess Cash Holding and Shareholder Wealth
Excess cash holding of 180 companies were identified over
the sample period by equation (2). In order to check the effect of
corporate cash holding on shareholder wealth, we regress Market
Capitalization (Proxy for shareholder’s wealth) and excess cash
holding with control variables RSize, Leverage, ROE, CCS and DPO.
The main reason for keeping these as control variables is that they
have some positive or negative significant relationship with cash
holding.
correlation of cash holding with leverage provides support to the
“pecking-order theory” in that a firm’s overdue liabilities are paid
through cash resources. The results of ROE is insignificant with cash
holding in both the models, which is in contrast with the idea that
companies which hold excess cash are more profitable, as a result of
which invest more and pay extra dividend  in future (Bigelli & Sánchez-
Vidal, 2012). Our results are also in contrast with the work of (Al-
Najjar, 2013). Lastly the coefficient of DPO shows positive but
insignificant relation with the cash holding in the first both the models.
These results are contradicts the findings of (Kim et al., 2011; Opler et
al., 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004) who argued that cash holdings has an
adverse relation with dividend payment.
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Table 6:
Regression results for Excess Cash and Shareholder Return
Variables Coef. Std. Err. t-Statistic P-Value 
Constant 0.466 0.427 1.090 0.276 
XCash 4.411 0.751 5.870 0.000 
RSize 0.835 0.029 28.820 0.000 
Leverage -0.028 0.296 -0.090 0.926 
CCS 0.445 0.372 1.200 0.231 
DPO 0.695 0.073 9.480 0.000 
ROE 0.001 0.001 1.310 0.190 
Observations 1620    
R-Square 0.415    
Adj. R-Square 0.413    
F- Statistics 190.56***       
***. Significant at 0.01 level    
 
The results from Table 6, show that excess cash holding has
a positive relation with market capitalization, which means that excess
cash holding increases shareholder wealth. These results are in
contrast with the finding of (Faulkender & Wang, 2006). However, the
results are consistent with (Huang & Wang, 2009), who argued that
cash increases the expected value of stock returns. Similarly, RSIZE
and DPO significantly positively affect shareholder wealth. It means
that large firm with more dividend increase shareholders wealth.
Furthermore, Leverage, CCS and ROE have insignificant relationship
with market capitalization which means that increase/decrease in these
control variables does not affect shareholder wealth. Thus from these
results we found that excess cash holding has positive effect on
shareholders wealth in Pakistan.
Conclusion
The motive of this study was to find the effect of corporate
cash holding on shareholder wealth in the Pakistani context. The
results from the two estimated models reveal that the size of the firm
(RSIZE) shows noteworthy positive correlation with cash holding,
whereas Leverage and CCS are negatively related to cash holding.
The negative correlation of leverage with cash holding provides
support to the “pecking-order theory” in that companies use cash
funds to pay back obligations when they turn out to be outstanding.
The coefficient of DPO and ROE is insignificant with cash holding in
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both the models, which is in contrast with the idea that companies
that hold excess cash are more profitable, as a result of which they pay
more dividends and invest more in future (Bigelli & Sánchez-Vidal,
2012). These results are also contribute some backing to the trade off
theory, especially to (Keynes, 1936) “precautionary motive” in that
companies hold excess cash. In order to check the effect of corporate
cash holding on shareholder wealth, we regressed market capitalization
and excess cash holding with control variables RSize, Leverage, CCS,
DPO and ROE. The result showed that excess cash holding has a
positive relation with market capitalization, which means that excess
cash holding increases shareholder wealth in Pakistan.
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